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Criminal Law: Chronic Alcoholism as a Defense to Crime
Defendant was charged with hit and run driving,' careless
driving,2 and simple assault.3 He contended at trial that he had
unexpectedly lost control of himself due to the effects of Val-
ium,4 a drug recently prescribed by his doctor.5 Arguing that
he lacked the requisite state of mind for the three offenses,6
defendant requested jury instructions on the defense of involun-
tary intoxication.7 The trial trial court refused and gave instead
1. MINN. STAT. § 169.09(2) (1976). Defendant made an illegal left
turn into an oncoming garbage truck. He immediately backed up and
slowly drove away from the scene of the collision in the badly damaged
automobile. Police observed the accident and stopped defendant about
a block from the scene. Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 853
(Minn. 1976).
2. MINN. STAT. § 169.13 (2) (1976).
3. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 870.160 (1973)
(current version at § 385.190 (1976)). Following the accident police of-
ficers took defendant to a hospital, but he fled after police established
his identity. Defendant refused to identify himself to an off-duty
uniformed policeman who spotted him. In defendant's attempt to escape,
an altercation occurred in which the officer's nose was broken. 238
N.W.2d at 854.
4. Defendant claimed that on the day of the incident the drug be-
gan to have a strange effect on him. He testified that he did not know
who owned the automobile he had been driving and that he was un-
able to remember anything about the accident or the events which fol-
lowed. 238 N.W.2d at 854. One police officer testified that defendant
appeared somewhat confused about his own identity after the accident.
Id. at 853. Defendant's doctor listed drowsiness, fatigue, ataxia, con-
fusion, and hyperexcitability as possible side effects of Valium. The
doctor further testified that he did not know if the drug might cause
one to be confused as to his identity, but in response to a hypothetical
question setting forth the facts of the case, the doctor stated that in his
opinion defendant may have been suffering from the effects of the drug.
Id. at 854.
5. Defendant's doctor testified that he had prescribed Valium, em-
pirin, bed rest, and heat. Id. at 854.
6. Id. The traffic offenses with which defendant was charged are
crimes of general intent. It is unclear whether simple assault is a gen-
eral intent or specific intent offense. See note 8 infra.
7. The proposed instructions read:
Intoxication is involuntary when it is produced in a person
without his willing and knowing use of intoxicating liquor, drugs
or other substance and without his willing assumption of the risk
of possible intoxication.
Proof of the involuntary intoxication of a defendant should
be considered by the jury in determining whether the defendant
had the capacity or ability to commit any of the ... offenses
with which he is charged or to form a criminal intent at the
time the offenses are alleged to have been committed.
238 N.W.2d at 854 n.2.
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a voluntary intoxication instruction for the assault charge
only.8 Defendant was acquitted of assault, but convicted of
the two traffic offenses.9 On appeal the Supreme Court of
Minnesota found that the trial court had erred in refusing to give
the requested instructions, holding that involuntary intoxication
is a defense to crimes that require proof of general intent or
negligence when defendant proves he committed the criminal act
while laboring under such a defect of reason due to involuntary
intoxication as not to know the nature of his act or that it was
wrong. Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 857 (Minn.
1976).
At common law, two distinct defenses were available to one
who committed a criminal act when intoxicated, each defined
according to the "voluntariness" with which the intoxicant was
consumed. The defense of "voluntary" intoxication reflected
competing policy considerations: 10 intoxication impaired the
inebriate's ability to regulate his behavior and therefore made
him less culpable than one who acted while sober,'- but the
8. The trial court instructed that defendant's alleged intoxication
would be a defense if it made him unable to formulate the specific intent
to inflict bodily harm, which the court claimed was an essential element
of the crime of simple assault. The supreme court did not decide
whether the voluntary intoxication instruction was appropriate, but it
noted that it had never determined whether that defense applied to
simple assault. Id. at 854. The trial court gave no similar instruction
for the two traffic offenses because voluntary intoxication is not a de-
fense to crimes of general intent. Id. at 855. See note 15 infra and ac-
companying text.
9. Defendant was sentenced to terms of 30 and 90 days in the
county workhouse, to be served concurrently with revocation of parole
from federal prison. 238 N.W.2d at 853.
10. The early common law rule was that all intoxication was "vol-
untary" and thus was never a defense to a criminal charge. See Pear-
son's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. 1108 (1835). See generally W. LAFAvE & A.
ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 341-51 (1972); Hall, Intoxication
and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HaRv. L. REV. 1045 (1944). Eventually
courts recognized that gross intoxication could reduce an actor's culpa-
bility, see note 12 infra, but a moral bias against intoxication-whether
"voluntary" or "involuntary"-has persisted. See Hall, supra, at 1057.
11. The criminal law assumes that everyone has free will and can
distinguish and choose between right and wrong. Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 & n.4 (1952); Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d
358, 364-66 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring); Greenawalt, "Un-
controllable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment: Implications of Powell
v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 927, 940-45 (1969). Assuming that a person
can adhere to the "right" if he is able to recognize it, conduct deviating
from that standard is sufficiently blameworthy to warrant punishment.
Hence, the law's assumption that free will exists means that a crime,
to be justly punishable, must consist of both a culpable act (actus reus)
and a culpable state of mind prompting that act (mens rea).
[Vol. 61:901
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inebriate was also blameworthy because he had freely assumed
the impairment, thereby reducing his ability to protect himself
and others against the risks created by his conduct.12 To miti-
gate the intoxicated offender's criminal liability, while at the
same time punishing him for his overindulgence,'1 3 courts seized
on the distinction made in criminal law between crimes of
"specific" and "general" intent; "voluntary" intoxication nega-
tived the existence of the former,14 but was no defense to crimes
The mens rea, or culpable intent, "refers to the blameworthiness en-
tailed in choosing to commit a criminal wrong." S. KADisa & M. PAUL-
sEN, CRIMnvAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 87 (3d ed. 1975). Without such
a blameworthy choice there is ordinarily insufficient reason for punish-
ment; if the defendant "did not know that the act was ethically wrong,
if he did not 'freely and deliberately' choose to commit the act, and if
he did not have the will to prevent the act, there is missing an ingredient
that has almost universally been considered essential before a crime can
be committed." State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17, 42, 199 N.W.2d 774, 788(1972). Because the "voluntary" inebriate can freely choose whether to
drink and thus to impair his ability to regulate his conduct, he is culpable
and can be justly punished for his crimes. See note 15 infra. The "in-
voluntary" inebriate, on the other hand, is not considered blameworthy
since "drunkenness without fault cannot supply the criminal intent." 1
J. BISHOP, CRnNAL LAW § 405 (9th ed. 1923). The distinction between
culpable and nonculpable intoxication appears to depend, then, on the
presence of mens rea--on the ability of the intoxicated offender to choose
to become intoxicated.
12. The policy implicit in the prevailing law represents compro-
mises between the punishment of inebriate offenders in complete
disregard of their condition, because it was brought on volun-
tarily, and the total exculpation suggested by the actual facts
at the time the harm occurred. A balance, in other words, has
been compounded from a realization, on the one hand, that the
moral culpability of a drunken homicide should be distinguished
from that of a sober person effecting a like injury, and from a
persistence of the belief, on the other hand, that a person who
voluntarily indulges in alcohol should not escape the conse-
quences.
Hall, supra note 10, at 1054. See note 15 infra.
13. "If a man ks punished for doing something when drunk that he
would not have done when sober, is he not in plain truth punished for
getting drunk?" G. WLLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw: THE GENERAL PART 957
(2d ed. 1961).
14. See LAFAvH & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 341; Hall, supra note 10,
at 1046-54, 1061-66. Minnesota's statutory equivalent of the common law
exculpatory doctrine reads as follows:
An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication
is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a particular in-
tent or other state of mind is a necessary element to constitute
a particular crime, the fact of intoxication may be taken into
consideration in determining such state of mind.
MINN. STAT. § 609.075 (1976). See notes 16-17 infra and accompanying
text.
Whether it is desirable to mitigate the voluntarily intoxicated of-
fender's liability is a matter of controversy. On the one hand, it has
been forcefully argued that the doctrine has a sound policy basis;
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based on general intent or negligence. 15 Proof of intoxica-
tion alone, however, was insufficient to establish that the of-
fender was incapable of formulating the -specific intent neces-
sary to commit a particular crime; the defendant also had to
show that he was so intoxicated that he was unable to under-
stand the nature of his act or that it was wrong'Q-the same
The present policy of the law which permits the disproof
of knowledge or purpose by evidence of extreme intoxication is
sound enough. If a crime (or a degree of crime) requires a
showing of one of these elements, it is because the conduct in-
volved presents a special danger, if done with purpose or know-
ledge or the actor presents a special cause for alarm. A burglar,
one who breaks in with a purpose to commit a felony, is more
dangerous than the simple housebreaker. The aggravated as-
saults are punished more severely precisely because of the
danger presented by the actor's state of mind.
Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 11.
On the other hand, the doctrine has sometimes produced incongruous
results that undermine the rule that "voluntary intoxication is no excuse
for crime." For example, if the defendant is found incapable of formu-
lating the specific intent necessary for the crime with which he is
charged, he may be convicted instead of a lesser included general intent
offense. Yet in some cases there may be no related general intent of-
fense on which conviction can be based, and complete acquittal will re-
sult. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 263 Ill. 564, 105 N.E. 744 (1914) (at-
tempted burglary); Hall, supra note 10, at 1062. Thus, the intoxicated
offender may be denied exculpation, receive partial exculpation, or
receive total exculpation, depending upon the nature of the crime with
which he is charged. As one commentator concludes: "It is thus appar-
ent that the criminal liability of the grossly intoxicated offender depends
upon the crime fortuitously committed while incapacitated." Note, Voli-
tional Fault and the Intoxicated Criminal Offender, 36 U. Cin. L. REV.
258, 276 (1967). Indeed, the purported distinction between crimes of
"specific" and "general" intent is itself considered suspect by many,
Paulsen's argument notwithstanding. Judge Kirbens summarizes the
views of these critics in the context of chronic alcoholism: "Criminal
liability should be keyed to the chronicity of the offender's alcoholism
rather than to the artificiality of the classification of crimes." Kirbens,
Chronic Alcohol Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 54 A.B.A.J. 877,
881 (1969).
15. Punishment was warranted for crimes of general intent or negli-
gence because voluntary consumption increased the risk of harm to
others:
It is precisely this possibility of choice that lies behind the
typical judicial expressions concerning intoxication and its signi-ficance for the criminal law.. . . Through a choice, of the sort
normally operative in the law, the inebriate has increased the
risk of harm to others by reducing his own capacity for takingdangers into account and for controlling himself. It would be
incongruous if an election of that sort would exculpate.
Paulsen, supra note 14, at 5.
16. It is not sufficient for the defendant to prove that he had been
drinking or even that he was drunk at the time the act was performed,
see, e.g., State v. DeFoe, 241 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. 1976); State v. Annis,
241 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. 1976), because there is no presumption that
[Vol. 61:901
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requirement imposed under some versions of the test for insani-
ty.1 7
The "involuntary" intoxication defense was based on the
assumption that one who consumed an intoxicant against his will
or without full awareness of the implications of his conduct was
not blameworthy. Several categories of "involuntary" intoxica-
tion were recognized at common law: intoxication produced
by external duress or coercion;' 8 intoxication produced by inno-
cent mistake or the trickery of another;' 9 intoxication unexpect-
edly excessive in light of the amount consumed;2 0 and intoxica-
a person who has been drinking is incapable of formulating an intent
to commit a certain crime. See State v. Lund, 277 Minn. 90, 151 N.W.2d
769 (1967); State v. Anderson, 270 Minn. 411, 134 N.W.2d 12 (1965). The
defendant must show that he was so intoxicated that he was unable to
distinguish right from wrong. State v. Weltz, 155 Minn. 143, 193 N.W.
42 (1923) (test); State v. Grear, 29 Minn. 221, 13 N.W. 140 (1882)
(burden of proof). That proof only serves to negate specific intent; it
does not prove that the defendant was "insane" within the meaning of
the insanity defense. See note 25 infra.
17. This standard is essentially the same as the M'Naghten test for
insanity, which permits acquittal of an accused if his "disease of the
mind" made him ignorant of "the nature and quality of his act" or the
fact that his act was wrong. M'Naghten's Case, 4 St.Tr.N.S. 847, 8 Eng.
Rep. 718 (1843). See note 25 infra.
18. See Borland v. State, 158 Ark. 37, 249 S.W. 591 (1923); State
v. Sopher, 70 Iowa 494, 30 N.W. 917 (1886); State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444,
196 S.E.2d 777 (1973); Perryman v. State, 12 Okla. Crim. 500, 159 P. 937
(1916). "Coerced intoxication" is discussed by the court in Altimus as
one of the four types of involuntary intoxication traditionally recognized
by the common law. 238 N.W.2d at 856. The opinion noted that al-
though some courts have indicated a willingness to recognize coerced in-
toxication as a complete defense to criminal liability, they have "strictly
construed the requirement of coercion . . . so that acquittal by reason
of intoxication is an exceedingly rare result." Id. The court cited Bur-
rows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029 (1931), as an example of this
tendency. In that case an eighteen-year-old youth was picked up while
hitchhiking in the Arizona desert. 'The driver urged the youth to drink
some alcohol but the boy refused, never having tasted liquor before. The
driver persisted, became abusive, and threatened to put him out of the
car. The youth, "being alone, penniless, and fearing that he might be
ejected and left on the desert," id. at 104, 297 P. at 1031, drank the al-
cohol, became intoxicated, and killed the driver. The court approved
the trial court's instruction that defendant's involuntary intoxication
would relieve him of all criminal liability if he had been compelled to
drink against his will by a coercive influence amounting to legal duress
and "that the mind of the defendant was incapable of understanding the
criminal nature of his act." Id. at 116, 297 P. at 1036. The jury appar-
ently found that defendant's intoxication was "voluntary," for he was
convicted of murder. See note 26 infra.
19. See Pribble v. People, 49 Colo. 210, 112 P. 220 (1910); People
v. Penman, 271 Ill. 82, 110 N.E. 894 (1915); LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note
10, at 348.
20. See Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
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tion that was an unforeseen side effect of a medically prescribed
drug.2 1 Intoxication in these instances was deemed blameless
because the offender did not freely choose to become intoxicat-
ed.22 Unlike the "voluntary" inebriate, then, the "involuntary"
inebriate did not willingly assume the risks of his intoxicated
conduct.23 "Involuntary" intoxication was therefore recognized
as a complete defense even to crimes of general intent or negli-
gence when the defendant established that his intoxication
caused him to be "temporarily insane" at the time of the act.
24
Thus, although both the "voluntary" and "involuntary" inebriate
(and, indeed, the insane offender) may have acted with the
same impaired state of mind, the law provided the involuntarily
intoxicated offender a much broader defense.25  In practice,
denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969); Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d
810 (1951); Note, supra note 14, at 277. This is "pathological intoxica-
tion," defined by the Model Penal Code as "intoxication grossly excessive
in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does
not know he is susceptible." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (5) (c) (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962). The court in Altimus suggested that pathologically
intoxicated offenders have been relieved of criminal liability when they
consumed the intoxicant without knowing that they were especially sus-
ceptible to its effects, but that some courts had limited the defense to
cases in which the intoxicated offender was deprived of mental capacity
to the degree necessary for an insanity defense. 238 N.W.2d at 856.
21. See Perkins v. United States, 228 F. 408 (4th Cir. 1915); Burnett
v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1955); Saldiveri v. State, 217 Md.
412, 143 4,2d 70 (1958). Intoxication resulting from ingestion of a medi-
cally prescribed drug was traditionally a defense when the drug was
taken pursuant to medical advice and had unexpected intoxicating effects
on the defendant. This was the defense raised in Altimus. 238 N.W.2d
at 857.
22. See notes 11 &'15 supra.
23. Compare the jury instructions in note 7 supra with the jury in-
structions in note 72 infra.
24. See notes 25 & 30-31 infra and accompanying text.
25. According to the court in Altimus, involuntary intoxication is
a defense only when the defendant was "temporarily insane" at the time
of the act. 238 N.W.2d at 857. The court meant that the insanity
standard is traditionally used to determine the extent of the offend-
er's impairment at the time of the act. In contrast, a full-fledged defense
of insanity is normally not available to the intoxicated offender unless
his mental "illness" or "defect" is "settled." Thus far the only form of
"settled" (that is, actual) insanity recognized as resulting from alcoholic
overindulgence is delirium tremens. See Note, Intoxication as a Crim-
inal Defense, 55 COLU1. L. REV. 1210, 1219-20 (1955). The rationale
appears to be that the defendant is not insane "just because he is in-
toxicated, for insanity requires a 'disease of the mind' (or, in modern
terminology, 'mental disease or defect'), a requirement which mere
drunkenness cannot satisfy; and therefore, being sane, he is not eligible
for the defense of insanity." LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 10, at 342. The
Model Penal Code reflects a similar rule. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (frequent drunkenness is insuf-
[Vol. 61:901
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however, few acquittals have been granted on this ground.26
Indeed, based on a review of reported cases involving alcohol-
related offenses, one authority concluded that the defense of
"involuntary intoxication is simply and completely nonexist-
ent.,,27
Minneapolis v. Altimus is the first reported Minnesota case
involving the defense of involuntary intoxication. The Minne-
sota supreme court held that "the defendant is entitled to assert
the defense of involuntary intoxication if due to such intoxica-
tion he unintentionally and non-negligently did the acts for
which he is charged." 28  It laid down three requirements for
successful assertion of the defense: "defendant must not know,
or have reason to know, that the prescribed drug is likely to have
an intoxicating effect"; 29 "the prescribed drug, and not some
ficient in itself to establish a mental illness that will excuse crime under
an insanity defense).
The law recognizes, however, that the intoxicated offender's mental
impairment may be incapacitating. Thus, the test for the defenses of vol-
untary and involuntary intoxication is stated in terms of the inebriate's
ability to understand the nature of his act or that it was wrong, see
note 16 supra & notes 30-31 infra and accompanying text-the same
language used in insanity cases under Minnesota's modified version of
the M'Naghten test. See MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (1976); State v. Rawland,
294 Minn. 17, 199 N.W.2d 774 (1972) (see notes 55-57 infra and accom-
panying text); State v. Finn, 257 Minn. 133, 100 N.W.2d 508 (1960); State
v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N.W. 62 (1889); State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 315
(1868). Minnesota case law has explicitly recognized this similarity. In
State v. Garvey, 11 Minn. 95 (1866), the court noted:
It is not pretended that intoxication is in any case an excuse
for crime, but when the intention of the party is an element of
the crime, insanity of any kind, or from any cause, which renders
the party incapable of forming any intention, and which is not
voluntarily induced with a view to the commission of a crime
while in that state, may be given in evidence to show that he
is not guilty of the specific crime with which he is charged.
Id. at 103 (emphasis omitted).
One anomaly stemming from these rules is that the intoxicated of-
fender who asserts either the defense of voluntary intoxication to contest
the existence of specific intent or, under Altimus, the defense of invol-
untary intoxication may, to some extent, be exculpated if able to qualify
under the applicable insanity standard, while the same intoxicated of-
fender who seeks to assert the insanity defense itself is denied exculpa-
tion unless suffering from "settled" insanity. See note 75 infra and ac-
companying text.
26. Courts have been unwilling to apply the defense, especially in
cases where the intoxication was produced by fraud or coercion. See
note 18 supra; Hall, supra note 10, at 1055-57; Paulsen, supra note 14,
at 18; Note, supra note 14, at 276 ("an acquittal has never occurred").
27. Hall, supra note 10, at 1056.
28. 238 N.W.2d at 855.
29. Id. at 857. The court stated that a defendant's knowledge of
the prescribed drug's likely intoxicating effect means that he is "volun-
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other intoxicant, is in fact the cause of defendant's intoxication
at the time of his alleged criminal conduct"; and "defendant,
due to involuntary intoxication, is temporarily insane."30 The
court adopted the Minnesota codification of the insanity defense
as the standard for the third requirement; defendant is exculpat-
ed if at the time of the act he was laboring under such a defect of
reason as not to know the nature of his act or that it was
wrong.3
1
The court's recognition that involuntary intoxication may
be a defense to crime when produced unexpectedly by a medi-
cally prescribed drug is significant as a matter of first Impression
in Minnesota. Although this form of involuntary intoxication is
but one of the categories recognized at common law, Altimus
suggests that the court will be equally receptive to the other
traditional forms of the defense-coerced and pathological in-
toxication and intoxication by innocent mistake.32 The court's
standard for testing the involuntarily intoxicated offender's men-
tal capacity-that he not know the nature of his act or that it
was wrong-appears applicable to all forms of the defense.
Moreover, the same basic policy underlies all of the categories-
an offender should not be held criminally liable for his acts
where his conduct was blameless because he did not willingly
assume the risks of his intoxicated behavior. Altimus has. thus
laid the foundation for the full development of a defense pre-
viously unrecognized by the state's courts.
tarily" intoxicated; he should thus be afforded only the partial defense
of voluntary intoxication provided by MmN. STAT. § 609.075 (1976). See
note 14 supra.
30. 238 N.W.2d at 857. The court noted that the case law is virtu-
ally unanimous in holding that involuntary intoxication is a defense only
when defendant is legally insane at the time of the act. Id. See note
25 supra.
31. 238 N.W.2d at 857. See MNN. STAT. § 611.026 (1976). This test
is usually referred to as the M'Naghten test, see note 17 supra; in Minne-
sota it has been modified by judicial construction, see note 54 infra. The
Altimus court recognized that other states have followed the Model
Penal Code standard, which provides:
Intoxication which (a) is not self-induced or (b) is pathological
is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the
actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate its criminality [wrongfulness] or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (4) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). It refused
to adopt that provision, however, in the absence of an express legislative
definition of the involuntary intoxication defense. 238 N.W.2d at 857-
58.
32. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
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But the holding of Altimus is perhaps less important than
its ultimate implications, for in light of certain principles ex-
pressed in prior case law,33 the availability of the involuntary
intoxication defense could lead to a wholly new doctrine of
exculpation for a certain class of offenders-chronic alcohol-
ics. 34 This potential development can be understood only in
connection with a 1969 Minnesota supreme court case, State v.
Fearon.35
In Fearon the Minnesota supreme court faced the issue of
the criminal responsibility of the chronic alcoholic for a "status"
crime.36 It held that a chronic alcoholic could not be convicted
33. In the broadest sense, Altimus and State v. Fearon, 283 Minn.
90, 166 N.W.2d 720 (1969), see text accompanying notes 36-42 infra, dis-
play the court's willingness to limit the use of criminal sanctions in deal-
ing with intoxicated offenders. Some members of the court displayed
the same tendency in Prideaux v. State, 247 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1976).
There the court held that any person required to take a blood-alcohol
test for driving while intoxicated had a statutory right to consult with
his attorney before submitting to the test. In a special concurrence,
Justice Todd suggested that
[t]he legislature should remove driving under the influence
from classification as a crime. Precedent exists for this action
since Minnesota has already decriminalized public drunkenness,
recognizing the medical, rather than the criminal, nature of this
problem. The fact that the intoxicated person is operating a
motor vehicle does not change the basic cause of the problem.
Id. at 395-96.
The court thus appears to be moving slowly toward a preference
for handling the problems of alcoholism through the health professions
rather than through the criminal justice system. See note 48 infra.
34. For a discussion of the definitional problems surrounding the
concept of chronic alcoholism, see generally Fingarette, The Perils of
Powell: In Search of a Factual Foundation for the "Disease Concept of
Alcoholism," 83 HAv. L. REV. 793 (1970).
35. 283 Minn. 90, 166 N.W.2d 720 (1969).
36. Many chronic alcoholic defendants have challenged the constitu-
tionality of their convictions under public drunkenness statutes which
allegedly punish them for the "status" of alcohol dependence. In Robin-
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the United States Supreme Court
held that a California statute making addiction to narcotics a criminal
offense violated the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment. Its holding suggested that to convict a person for
a "status," such as addiction, which is unrelated to any anti-social act
yet committed within the jurisdiction, is unconstitutional. Id. at 667. But
the Court's characterization of addiction as an "illness," id., raised the
question whether acts committed while influenced by such an "illness"
were criminally punishable. Two federal circuit courts of appeals relied
on the reasoning of Robinson to void the public drunkenness convictions
of individuals afflicted with the "illness" of chronic alcoholism; both
noted the questionable constitutionality of statutes criminally punishing
the chronic alcoholic for "status" acts-those "compulsive as sympto-
matic of the disease" of chronic alcoholism. Easter v. District of Colum-
19771
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under a statute prohibiting intoxication produced by the "volun-
tary" consumption of intoxicating liquors37 because his drinking
was "due to his disease and involuntary. s3 8 Defendant's chronic
alcoholism destroyed his ability to choose to drink and thus
prevented formulation of the mens rea necessary to convict
him.39 At least for the chronic alcoholic whose drinking was
bia, 361 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d
761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
Efforts to extend the Robinson "status" rationale to acts similarly
"compulsive as symptomatic of the disease" of chronic alcoholism were
hindered, however, by the Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514 (1968). Mr. Justice Marshall's plurality opinion indicated
that a chronic alcoholic's public intoxication involved more than "mere
status" since the state had an interest in preventing obnoxious public
behavior. 392 U.S. at 532. See also Vick v. State, 453 P.2d 342 (Alas.
1969); People v. Hoy, 380 Mich. 597, 158 N.W.2d 463 (1968); Seattle v.
Hill, 72 Wash. 2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 872
(1968). Nevertheless, the court in Fearon regarded the eighth amend-
ment argument as an additional ground for refusing to punish the de-
fendant chronic alcoholic under Minnesota's voluntary drunkenness stat-
ute., 283 Minn. at 97, 166 N.W.2d at 724.
37. The statute, in relevant part, read: "Every person who becomes
intoxicated by voluntarily drinking intoxicating liquors is guilty of the
crime of drunkenness . . . ." 1889 Minn. Laws ch. 13, § 1 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 340.96 (1969)) (repealed 1973).
38. 283 Minn. at 97, 166 N.W.2d at 724. Bernard Fearon showed that
his excessive alcohol consumption had resulted, in a dishonorable dis-
charge from the Army, caused him to lose his family and a series of jobs,
and led to numerous arrests for drunkenness. He claimed he had been
intoxicated at least 50 percent of the time for over 20 years. He testified
that he could not control his drinking, though he had made many at-
tempts to do so, and that he thought about drinking constantly. Id. at
91, 166 N.W.2d at 721. Five "expert" witnesses (two psycfiiatrists, one
of whom worked with alcoholics, a psychologist, a social worker, and a
minister, all of whom worked extensively with alcoholics) testified that
"alcoholism is a disease and is recognized as such by the American Medi-
cal Association; that a chronic alcoholic does not drink voluntarily and
cannot control his drinking; and that defendant is a 'classic case' of
chronic alcoholism." Id. at 91-92, 166 N.W.2d at 721. In response to a
question on cross-examination as to whether defendant, if sober, would
know the consequences of his act, the psychologist indicated that if de-
fendant were an alcoholic, as he believed he was, then even when sober,
"'there is a very good chance that on many occasions with respect to
consuming alcoholic beverages he would not be able to make a judgment
of right or wrong in terms of consequences of his act.'" Id. at 92, 166
N.W.2d at 721. One of the psychiatrists testified that, "'[a]t the present
time, whether this man takes a drink or not is not a matter of choice
to him. It is beyond the strength of his will to decide whether to drink
or not.'" Id. at 95, 166 N.W.2d at 723. He also stated that loss of control
over the consumption of alcohol was the characteristic which made al-
coholism a disease. Id. Another witness indicated that Fearon's loss of
control extended both to when and to how much alcohol was consumed.
Id. The evidence was unrebutted by the state.
39. Id. at 96-97, 166 N.W.2d at 724. See note 11 supra. Al-
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compelled by disease, 40 Fearon rejected the traditional rule that
"voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crime"41 and also under-
mined the traditional justification advanced for punishing the
intoxicated offender-that choosing to drink increases the risk of
harm to others.42 Reading Fearon and Altimus together raises an
though the statute prohibited "voluntarily" drinking to the point of in-
toxication, the court noted that "even without the word 'voluntarily' in
the statement, it should not be construed to mean that a person who
did not choose to drink is subject to conviction," id. at 94, 166 N.W.2d
at 722-23, since "it has long been clear under Minnesota law that a person
cannot be convicted of a crime where there was no intent to do the act
which constitutes the crime." Id., 166 N.W.2d at 722. Cf. State v.
Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 114 N.W.2d 88 (1962) (motorist who neither in-
tended to commit the offense nor was negligent in maintaining his vehi-
cle held not subject to criminal liability for failing to stop at a red light
because his brakes failed).
40. All of the defense evidence was based upon the underlying pre-
mise that alcoholism is a disease. The court noted that this concept had
only recently received "widespread" medical and public acceptance, at-
tributable to developments "in man's knowledge of himself and his en-
vironment.". 283 Minn. at 96, 166 N.W.2d at 724.
The court did not specify how the "disease" deprived defendant of
the ability to control the consumption of alcohol-whether it was due
to physical "addiction," a psychological dependence, a function of a dis-
order of personality, or some other cause. Most of the testimony seemed
to emphasize the psychological nature of the problem. Such imprecision
indicates the lack of concrete scientific data on alcoholism. For example,
although Mr. Justice Fortas advocated application of the "disease concept
of alcoholism" in his Powell dissent, he acknowledged that "there is a
great deal that remains to be discovered about chronic alcoholism ....
[M]any aspects of the disease remain obscure ... ." 392 U.S. at 559.
As in the case of mental disease, "[w]e are . . . woefully deficient in
our medical, diagnostic; and therapeutic knowledge" of the problem.
Id. at 559-60. But he emphasized the defendant's inability to "'resist
the constant, excessive consumption of alcohol'" as the essence of the
"disease." Id. at 558.
Although there is some problem in defining the concept, its core
meaning, as agreed by authorities, is that alcoholism is caused
and maintained by something other than the moral fault of the
alcoholic, something that, to a greater or lesser extent depending
upon the physiological or psychological make-up and history of
the individual, cannot be controlled by him.
Id. at 560-61 (emphasis added).
41. The court recognized that in terming Fearon's drinking "invol-
untary" it was taking a novel approach to the problems of the chronic
alcoholic: "The fact that a chronic alcoholic would have been considered
a voluntary drinker in 1889 does not compel us to conclude that he must
be so classed in 1969." 283 Minn. at 96, 166 N.W.2d at 724. See note
10 supra.
42. See note 15 supra. While the chronic alcoholic's conduct is no
less risk-creating than is the voluntary inebriate's since, for both, alcohol
intoxication relaxes inhibitory controls and reduces ability to regulafe
behavior, there is no reason to punish where the loss of control is not
the product of choice, that is, where the mens rea upon which punish-
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interesting possibility: Fearon suggests that a chronic alcoholic's
intoxication may be "coerced" and therefore not blameworthy;
the logical extension of Altimus suggests that the defense of
coerced intoxication should be available to exonerate the chronic
alcoholic from criminal responsibility for offenses committed
while intoxicated.4
3
For successful assertion of the coerced intoxication defense,
courts have traditionally required that the coercion be from an
external source. 4 The clear import of Fearon, however, is that
the chronic alcoholic's inability to determine when and how much
he will drink is also coerced: "on the evidence presented in
this case, defendant was no more able to make a free choice as to
when or how much he would drink than a person would be who
is forced to drink under the threat of physical violence."45 The
logic underlying this analysis of the chronic alcoholic's "compul-
sion" would support allowing an "involuntarily" intoxicated
chronic alcoholic to raise a coerced intoxication defense even to
ment of the risk-creating conduct theoretically depends is not present.
See notes 10-12, 18-24 supra and accompanying text.
The Minnesota legislature responded favorably to the decision in
Fearon by codifying its holding and by repealing the statute under which
Fearon had been convicted.
Notwithstanding any provision of local laws or ordinances
no person shall be charged with or convicted of the offense of
drunkenness or public drunkenness. Nothing herein shall pre-
vent the prosecution and conviction of any intoxicated person
for offenses other than drunkenness or public drunkenness nor
shall this section relieve any person from civil liability for any
injury to persons or property caused by such person while in-
toxicated.
MxNK. STAT. § 340.961 (1976).
43. The defense of involuntary intoxication is currently unavailable
to the chronic alcoholic in virtually all jurisdictions. The reason is clear:
"To date, 'voluntary' drunkenness is any drinking not caused fraudu-
lently or coercively, or by mental disease amounting to insanity. Thus,
subject to a few narrow exceptions, all drinking is voluntary." Note,
supra note 14, at 287.
44. Hall, supra note 10, at 1055-56.
45. 283 Minn. at 96, 166 N.W.2d at 724. See also Comment, Decrim-
inalization of Alcoholism, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 755, 763 n.46 (1975). In State
v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869), the court recognized, in the context of its
discussion of the insanity defense, that disease as well as external force
can constitute duress:
When disease is the propelling, uncontrollable power, the man
is as innocent as the weapon,-the mental and moral elements
are as guiltless as the material. If his mental, moral, and bodily
strength is subjugated and pressed to an involuntary service, it
is immaterial whether it is done by his disease, or by another
man, or a brute or any physical force of art or nature set in
operation without fault on his part.
Id. at 441.
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general intent offenses. For such a defense to succeed, how-
ever, the defendant would first have to show that the coercion
was sufficient to deprive him of the ability to avoid the risk-
creating intoxication on the occasion in question. Traditionally,
coercion has been measured by a very strict standard, requiring
proof of "such duress as would afford a defense to a charge of
crime."46  This standard deprives the defense of much of its
practical significance and has undoubtedly contributed to the
absence of reported acquittals based upon it. 47  The court's
language in Fearon, however, equating compulsion by disease
with compulsion by physical force, indicates that a more flexible
approach may be appropriate in the case of chronic alcoholism,
and the defense could thus prove more useful in Minnesota than
in other jurisdictions.48
Under the suggested analysis drawn from Fearon the
chronic alcoholic could raise only a fact question as to the
"involuntariness" of his intoxication; under Altimus, he would
also have to show that the involuntary intoxication caused him
to be "temporarily insane" at the time of the act.49 It is appar-
ent from reported Minnesota cases dealing with the voluntary
intoxication defense5" that courts apply the "temporary insanity"
test strictly, and reversals based on satisfaction of the require-
ment are rare, even where the defendant was clearly intoxicated
at the time of the act.51 Similarly, defendants in other jurisdic-
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (5) (b) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Cf.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (5) (b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) ("such
duress as would afford a defense to a charge of crime" changed to "such
circumstances" so as to make applicable the choice of evils defense of
section 3.02). See also cases cited in note 18 supra; Hall, supra note
10, at 1056; Paulsen, supra note 14, at 18-19.
47. See text accompanying note 27 supra. See also Paulsen, supra
note 14, at 18-19. It should be noted that coerced intoxication as tradi-
tionally defined is likely to arise only infrequently. The Altimus court
drew a similar conclusion from the lack of case law on involuntary in-
toxication by prescribed drug. 238 N.W.2d at 858.
48. Both the Minnesota supreme court and the legislature have dis-
played a willingness to re-examine traditional attitudes and approaches
in dealing with alcoholics. As the court noted in Fearon, the legislative
attitude toward the alcoholic indicates some recognition of the concept
of alcoholism as a disease. 283 Minn. at 99, 166 N.W.2d at 762. The court
in Fearon urged prosecutors to exercise careful discretion in determining
whether to seek civil commitment of inebriates for treatment or to im-
pose criminal sanctions, suggesting that the former was more appropriate
for the chronic alcoholic. Id. at 100, 166 N.W.2d at 726.
49. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
50. See note 25 supra.
51. See State v. DeFoe, 241 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. 1976); State v. Anmis,
241 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. 1976); State v. Kolodge, 293 Minn. 413, 196 N.W.2d
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tions who have attempted to interpose chronic alcoholism as a
defense have, as yet, been unable to satisfy the temporary insani-
ty requirement.
52
The chronic alcoholic may more easily meet this burden in
Minnesota, however, because the insanity test 53 has recently
been liberalized. In State v. Rawland,54 the court held that the
trier of fact may consider not only the defendant's ability to
know and understand the nature and quality of his act but also
his capacity to control his conduct. 55 Although the Rawland
test is similar to the Model Penal Code test rejected by the court
in Altimus,5 6 it is nevertheless reasonable to presume that the
court's adoption of the statutory insanity standard was intended
to encompass the court's previous construction of that standard in
Rawland.57 Thus, while Rawland does not alter the require-
920 (1972); State v. Carlson, 291 Minn. 536, 192 N.W.2d 184 (1971); State
v. Dineen, 289 Minn. 250, 184 N.W.2d 16 (1971); State v. O'Donnell, 280
Minn. 213, 158 N.W.2d 699 (1968); State v. Bonga, 278 Minn. 181, 153
N.W.2d 127 (1967); State v. Weltz, 155 Minn. 143, 193 N.W. 42 (1923).
52. See People v. Wyatt, 22 Cal. App. 3d 671, 99 Cal. Rptr. 674
(1972); Staples v. State, 245 N.W.2d 679 (Wis. 1976); Roberts v. State,
41 Wis. 2d 537, 164 N.W.2d 525 (1969).
53. See note 25 supra. For the text of the Minnesota insanity de-
fense, see MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (1976).
54. 294 Minn. 17, 199 N.W.2d 774 (1972). In Rawland the court up-
held the constitutionality of Minnesota's insanity statute, which is based
on the common law M'Naghten standard. Defendant's conviction was
reversed, however, as the court found the evidence sufficient to meet the
statutory requirement. While referring to the strict right-and-wrong test
of M'Naghten, the court emphasized the role of the factfinder in deter-
mining insanity: "In determining whether or not a defendant has met
the burden imposed on him by statute to prove absence of guilt because
of insanity, the factfinder may give credence to competent evidence that
relates to cognition, volition, and capacity to control behavior." Id.
at 46, 199 N.W.2d at 790. This in effect makes the M'Naghten test sim-
flar to the "irresistible impulse" test used in several other jurisdictions.
See Note, Standards of Mental Illness in the Insanity Defense and Police
Power Commitments: A Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 60 Mm.
L. REv. 1289, 1292 n.8 (1976).
55. 294 Minn. at 46, 199 N.W.2d at 790.
56. The Rawland court referred to a right-and-wrong test of in-
sanity, but emphasized that the test would include incompetency to
choose: "Although [the statute] does not use the terms competency or
capacity, the statute speaks of laboring under such a defect of reason
as not to know the nature of his act or that it was wrong. Upon an-
alysis, we find little distinction." Id. at 44, 199 N.W.2d at 789. Like
the Rawland test, the Model Penal Code emphasizes the capacity of the
actor. See note 31 supra.
57. There is some inconsistency in assuming that the court intended
to adopt the Rawland construction of the insanity defense in its definition
of involuntary intoxication, since the court explicitly rejected the similar
Model Penal Code standard. For a comparison of the Rawland test of
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ment that the offender be "temporarily insane," its recognition
that inability to control behavior is a factor that may be con-
sidered in judging mental incapacity affords triers of fact
greater flexibility in determining the criminal responsibility of
chronic alcoholics asserting a coerced intoxication defense.
While the combined reasoning of Altimus and Fearon logi-
cally suggests that the court would be receptive to an involuntary
intoxication defense asserted by a chronic alcoholic, neither case,
of course, is authoritatively on point. But the argument favor-
ing recognition of the defense is further buttressed by strong
policy considerations. The Minnesota legislature has stated that
the most important policies underlying the criminal code are
prevention and deterrence, rehabilitation, and isolation.58 Pre-
venting and deterring crime would not seem to be promoted by
criminally punishing the chronic alcoholic. The court in
Fearon, for example, regarded the lack of deterrent effect as an
additional ground for refusing to punish the chronic alcoholic
for "voluntary" drunkenness.59 The threat of criminal punish-
ment is equally unlikely to deter the chronic alcoholic, who is
unable to foresee or to intend the criminal consequences of
incapacitating intoxication, from committing other types of of-
fenses. 60 Preventing the chronic alcoholic's risk-creating drink-
ing itself would seem to be the only way to prevent his subse-
quent criminal acts; hence, punishment for the crime would
reach the symptom but not the cause of his criminal behavior."'
insanity with that of the Model Penal Code, see note 56 suprd. Neverthe-
less, it would seem equally inconsistent to assume that the court would
ignore, even in the context of a newly recognized defense, its own con-
struction of the very statute it was adopting. Moreover, in giving guid-
ance to the lower courts in applying the insanity standard as an element
of the involuntary intoxication defense, the Altimus court specifically re-
ferred to Rule 14 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
commentary to the Rule notes "Rule 14... adds the plea of not guilty
by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency as defined by Minn. Stat.
§ 611.026 (1971) with its judicial interpretations ... '." MIN. R. CRIM.
P. 14, Comment (emphasis added).
58. Mnqx. STAT. § 609.01 (1) (1974).
59. 283 Minn. at 98, 166 N.W.2d at 725. But see Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514, 528-31 (1968).
60. According to the President's Crime Commission, "[tlhe criminaljustice system appears ineffective to deter drunkenness or to meet the
problems of the chronic alcoholic offender." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICF, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIvE IN A FREE SocIETY 235 (1967).
61. "One thing is certain, however: Anyone who wants to restore
[chronic alcoholics] to their families and communities as useful and self-
respecting citizens would better deal with them as problem drinkers who
have committed a crime rather than as criminals who happen to be prob-
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Nor would a prison sentence ordinarily "rehabilitate" the chronic
alcoholic; the effectiveness of jail as a rehabilitative tool for any
offender has been seriously questioned. 62 For both of these pur-
poses, civil treatment of the defendant's alcoholism seems a more
humane and effective means of protecting society against the
potentially threatening aspects of his conduct.63 Criminal incar-
ceration does serve to isolate the offender, thus protecting society
from those chronic alcoholics who may be dangerous to them-
selves and to others and, therefore, in need of social control;
6 4
lem drinkers." MacCormick, Correctional Views on Alcohol, Alcoholism,
and Crime, 9 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 15, 26-27 (1963). See note 33 supra.
Some critics question whether this "problem" may legitimately be iden-
tified as the "cause" of a chronic alcoholic's criminality. See, e.g., Bacon,
Alcohol, Alcoholism, and Crime, 9 CnmvE & DELINQUENCY 1, 14 (1963)
("Simply stating that alcohol (or drunkenness or alcoholism) was a
cause or, even worse, the cause of criminality is likely to increase mis-
understanding and result in ineffective answers. This sort of over-sim-
plification is on a par with the other single-cause explanations of crime:
climate, ethnic background, poverty, lack of affection, boredom, over-
stimulation, or devils.").
62. On the dubious "rehabilitative" effects of imprisonment gen-
erally, see Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correction Programs,
17 CRiM E & DELINQUENCY 67, 71-72 (1971) ("It is difficult to escape the
conclusion that the act of incarcerating a person at all will impair what-
ever potential he has for crime-free future adjustment and that, regard-
less of which 'treatments' are administered while he is in prison, the
longer he is kept there the more will he deteriorate and the more likely
is it that he will recidivate."). Some inmate alcoholics have, however,
been helped by Alcoholics Anonymous, which has established chapters
at most American penal institutions. See MacCormick, supra note 61, at
24-27.
63. Criminal incarceration and punishment are not necessarily in-
consistent with "treatment" of the offender:
Punishment is manifestly unpleasant and may or may not
"work," whereas treatment, while not intrinsically pleasant,
escapes the definitely unpleasant connotations of punishment;
furthermore, it is impliedly effective: treatment, almost by def-
inition, is that which results in improvement of a condition.
Thus, treatment gains both an aura of being nicer (more hu-
mane) and better (more effective).
In correctional practice, treatment and punishment generally
coexist and cannot appropriately be viewed as mutually ex-
clusive .... The punitive conditions are viewed as necessary
for the administration of treatment, and the treatments are be-
lieved to account for whatever favorable results occur.
The real choice in correction, then, is not between treatment
on one hand and punishment on the other but between one treat-
ment-punishment alternative and another.
Robison & Smith, supra note 62, at 79-80. A noncriminal treatment-pun-
ishment alternative for the chronic alcoholic offender, however, has much
to recommend it. See note 72 infra. See generally Kittrie, The Divest-
ment of Criminal Law and the Coming of the Therapeutic State, 1 SUF-
FOLK U.L. REv. 43, 70-76 (1967).
64. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 538-39 (1968) (Black, J., con-
curring).
[Vol. 61:901
CASE COMMENT
but civil commitment and treatment is still superior, for it
simultaneously isolates the offender and treats the underly-
ing cause of his dangerousness.6 5 Society has a duty to the
individual subject to its control to protect him "against the mis-
use of the criminal law by fairly defining the acts and omissions
prohibited, authorizing sentences reasonably related to the con-
duct and character of the convicted person, and prescribing fair
and reasonable post-conviction procedures."6 6 Punishing the
chronic alcoholic seems to constitute precisely such misuse; it
merely removes him from public view without helping to elimi-
nate the cause of his risk-creating conduct. Society derives little
benefit from punishing those who are unable to control them-
selves. 67
It is also evident, however, that society would not benefit
from abuse of the coerced intoxication defense by defendants
who claim to be "chronic alcoholics" but actually can control
their drinking to some degree. Accurately identifying those
defendants whose "involuntary" criminal conduct may legit-
imately be attributed to chronic alcoholism would, therefore,
seem to present the most crucial problem in administering the
defense. The focus must be on the individual defendant, since
not all chronic alcoholics are so compelled by their disease
to drink to the point of incapacitation as to support a claim of
duress or coercion.6 8 Because our understanding of alcoholism
does not yet permit us confidently to identify the cause of its ap-
pearance in a particular individual or to predict its effects on his
conduct,69 many alcoholics who assert the defense will and should
65. See note 72 ifra and accompanying text.
66. MIm. STAT. § 609.01(2) (1976).
67. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966)
("[S] ociety has recognized over the years that none of the three asserted
purposes of the criminal law-rehabilitation, deterrence and retribu-
tion-is satisfied when the truly irresponsible, those who lack substantial
capacity to control their actions, are punished.").
68. See Comment, supra note 45, at 778.
69. Labelling the individual offender a "chronic alcoholic" or term-
ing his alcohol consumption "involuntary" adds little to the analysis of
the behavior of a particular intoxicated offender. Clearly, proof of actual
loss of control over intake must be required in every case in which a
defendant seeks to assert a defense of involuntary intoxication based on
chronic alcoholism. The presence of behavioral control was an obvious
factor, for example, in Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir.
1968), where the court rejected a defendant's claim that his chronic
alcoholism should itself be sufficient to raise a criminal responsibility
issue. Instead, "[tihe accused must show some evidence that he has
lost the capacity to control his behavior not simply with respect to
drinking, but in other contexts as well." Id. at 364. Trial by label
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be unsuccessful. Nevertheless, if the trier of fact is convinced
that a defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the act that he
could not have exercised the restraint necessary to avoid the
criminal act, and that the intoxication resulted from an inability
to control the consumption of alcohol due to the disease of
chronic alcoholism, then that defendant should be excused from
criminal responsibility regardless of the nature or seriousness of
the offense. 70 Any other conclusion would be contrary to the
theory on which the involuntary intoxication defense is based,
that criminal blameworthiness depends upon the presence of
the choice to become intoxicated.1 1 Acquittal should not, how-
ever, necessarily result in the chronic alcoholic's release, for the
likelihood that he would repeat his behavior would endanger the
community. Thus, civil commitment and treatment would seem
to be required whenever an acquittal for a serious crime was
based on this defense.72
should be avoided, for " [n]owhere is the lack of scientific data more evi-
dent than in the consideration of the derelict's involvement with alcohol."
Murtagh, Arrests for Public Intoxication, 35 FoDmEAM L. Rav. 1, 9-10
(1966). See also Kirbens, supra note 14, at 882.
70. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.08(4) (Proposed Official Draft,
1962) (text in note 31 supra); Kirbens, supra note 14, at 881; Comment,
supra note 45, at 772.
71. See notes 11 & 15 supra.
72. The jury would be instructed that if it finds that the defend-
ant was suffering from a disease, and that his actions were a
product of that disease, it should find the defendant not guilty.
Using civil commitment procedures, the defendant should then
be committed to an appropriate treatment facility.
Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d 358, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright,
J., concurring). See Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 971; Kirbens, supra
note 14, at 882-83. Civil commitment is certainly no panacea. Counsel
for amici curiae in Powell, representing the ACLU and other groups, in-
dicated that the legal battles in Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d
50 (D.C. Cir. 1966), and Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764-65 (4th Cir.
1966), were not waged in order for defendants to be involuntarily com-
mitted even longer than their possible jail sentences, without assurance
that they would receive appropriate care and treatment. Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 529-30 n.24 (1968). As Mr. Justice Marshall argued
in Powell
[F]acilities for the attempted treatment of indigent alcoholics
are woefully lacking throughout the country. It would be tragic
to return large numbers of helpless, sometimes dangerous and
frequently unsanitary inebriates to the streets of our cities with-
out even an opportunity to sober up adequately which a brief
jail term provides. Presumably no State or city will tolerate
such a state of affairs. Yet the medical profession cannot, and
does not, tell us with any assurance that, even if the buildings,
equipment and trained personnel were made available, it could
provide anything more than slightly higher-class jails for our
indigent habitual inebriates. Thus we run the grave risk that
nothing will be accomplished beyond the hanging of a new
sign-reading 'hospital'--over one wing of the jailhouse.
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Extension of the coerced intoxication defense to the chronic
alcoholic would significantly change the existing law of intoxica-
tion. The common law now provides only the defenses of
voluntary intoxication and insanity to the chronic alcoholic who
acts while intoxicated. 73 Both defenses are of limited utility,
since voluntary intoxication serves only to reduce the severity
of the offense for which the defendant can be convicted and
applies only to specific intent offenses, 74 while insanity, al-
though a complete defense, is available only to the alcoholic
offender suffering from delirium tremens.75 The coerced intox-
ication defense, on the other hand, would apply to both general
and specific intent offenses and would eliminate all criminal
responsibility.7" Thus, the defendant relieved of criminal liabil-
ity in Fearon for the "status" offense of voluntary drunkenness
could potentially be excused for a non-status offense such as
murder. The latter is a new possibility for intoxicated offenders
Id. at 528-29. See also Hutt, Modern Trends in Handling the Chronic
Alcoholic Offender, 19 S. CAR. L. REv. 305, 318-23 (1967); Szasz, Alcohol-
ism: A Socio-Ethical Perspective, 6 WAsHBum L.J. 255, 260-68 (1967).
The Minnesota Hospitalization and Commitment Act, Minx. STAT.
§§ 253A.01-.21 (1976), governing the involuntary commitment of "in-
ebriates," seems to provide, however, a procedure by which the chronic
alcoholic convicted of a non-status offense could receive treatment while
isolated for the protection of society. Under Rule 20.02(8) of the Minne-
sota Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant found not guilty by reason
of insanity or mental irresponsibility is to be committed under the pro-
visions of the Hospitalization and Commitment Act, subject to the review
of the trial court on the duration of commitment. Though such commit-
ment would be inappropriate in cases like Altimus, where the defend-
ant's involuntary intoxication was unlikely to recur, the criminally irre-
sponsible chronic alcoholic may pose a continuing threat to society.
Hence, though complete criminal exculpation would be appropriate, civil
commitment and treatment would seem necessary where a chronic al-
coholic has successfully asserted an involuntary intoxication defense to
a serious crime.
73. See LAFAVE & ScOTT, supra note 10, at 341-50; Note, Intoxication
as a Criminal Defense, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1210 (1955).
74. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
75. See note 25 supra. The insanity defense is often denied to the
chronic alcoholic simply on the basis of the law's moral bias against the
"voluntary" consumption of alcohol. After reviewing a series of cases
demonstrating precisely this point, Professor Hall concluded: "Thus we
find many competent courts ignoring serious physical injuries, addiction,
chronic alcoholism, delirium tremens, confusing psychoses because ac-
companied by intoxication, and, in general, adhering to a course of ad-judication that can only be regarded as unenlightened." Hall, supra note
10, at 1060. The fact is that, "[wJhile alcoholism may not be a mental
disease recognized clinically, heavy drinking is often a symptom of deep
mental disturbance." Paulsen, supra note 14, at 21.
76. See note 18 supra. See also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 69 (1961);
LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 10, at 341,
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in Minnesota7 7 and thus could be a source of controversy. But
recognition of this defense would be logically consistent with
Minnesota case law and the policies underlying the criminal code.
The chronic alcoholic who is unable to resist his compulsion to
drink is not blameworthy when his disability has led to incapa-
citating intoxication. Chronic alcoholics who commit offenses
while so incapacitated as to be "temporarily insane" should,
therefore, be excused. The goals of protecting society and
humanely dealing with the chronic alcoholic offender would be
better served by treatment and, where appropriate, civil com-
mitment than by traditional criminal penalties. The coerced
intoxication defense would serve both of these ends.
77. The insanity defense has been of limited utility to most offend-
ers with alcohol-related problems. See note 25 supra.
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